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“You’re biased!”  
…Now What? 
 
 
Awareness of bias is often treated like an item on a checklist of things we should pay 
attention to when thinking critically—and that’s the last we hear of it.  But awareness 
of bias isn’t the end of the story; it’s just the beginning. 
  
Manuals claiming to be about Critical Thinking often warn us to beware of bias in the 
information we’re consuming.  We’re rarely told what to do next, however.   How 
ought we to respond with this awareness? 
 
Well, it depends on whether the source is making an argument or a mere assertion. 
 
Claims/Assertions 
 
First, there may be bias in people’s assertions, as when 
someone of a particular political persuasion comments 
favorably or unfavorably on some public policy or law.  
But the fact that this person has some political bias does 
not show that their comment is unwarranted, 
unreasonable, or false.  The person’s bias is simply 
irrelevant to the legitimacy or truth of their comment.    
Their comment must be judged on its own merits. 
 
If the person has given no reason for their assertion, 
and we are not aware of any independent reasons 
supporting it but are aware of the person’s bias, we may 
not be justified in assuming what they’ve said is true. 
 
But even in this case the person’s bias by itself does not 
provide us with a reason for thinking that what they’re 
saying false.  
 
Case 1 
For example, consider the tobacco companies’ long 
insistence that smoking was harmless.  Greed prevented 
them from telling the truth, but our rejection of their 
claim was based on medical evidence to the contrary, 
not their greed.   
 
Case 2 
Consider a parallel case: suppose a teacher tells a class 
full of students that education is very important and 
that they should stay in school. A clever student raises 
their hand and points out that the teacher has a vested 
interest in students’ remaining in college: if too many of 
them drop out, the teacher may become unemployed!   
 
Has the student given a good reason to reject the 
teacher’s claims?  Surely not.  The teacher’s claims must 
stand or fall on their own merits; the teacher’s bias in 
favor of education (even if crassly economic!) is simply 
irrelevant.  
 
Arguments/Inferences 
 
In the case of inferences, similar considerations apply, 
but with an added dimension.   
 
Case 3 
Let’s fill out case 2 above a bit: let’s suppose that the 
teacher supports their assertion by pointing out to the 
students that their lives will enriched by continuing 
their education, their capacity to appreciate life 
experiences will be deepened by it, future employment 
prospects heightened, and so on.   
 
Now consider a student rejecting this argument, not by 
disputing these supporting reasons, but by again 
pointing out the teacher’s bias. 
 
It’s important to recognize that the teacher may in fact 
be biased.  But it’s more important to recognize that the 
teacher’s bias has no bearing on whether her inference 
follows from the reasons she has given. 
 
The relationship between premises and conclusion is a 
relationship between statements, so to tell whether the 
one follows from the others we must look at the 
statements, not at the person making them.  The arguer’s 
bias is simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of the 
inference. 
 
Case 4  
Rejecting arguments based on the arguer’s bias is very 
common in politics.  Note how easily we dismiss a 
senator’s favorable (or unfavorable) view of a bill by 
pointing out that they voted along party lines, rather 
than by examining the reasons they gave for voting that 
way.  It’s a lot easier to reject someone’s arguments for a 
view by pointing out that it conforms to their party’s 
views, than to engage in a careful and critical 
examination of their reasons! 
 
 The Take-Away 
 
There are, of course, many types of bias, and often bias can and should make us 
think twice about whether to accept what someone is saying.   But rarely should it 
decide the issue for us.   
 
Recognition of bias when considering mere assertions or claims should lead us to 
seek out further relevant information, and it’s this further information that we 
should rely on.  Deciding to actually disbelieve someone’s claim because they’re 
biased is a form of the ad hominem fallacy, i.e., rejecting a view on the basis of who 
holds it rather than on the basis of the merits of the view itself. 
 
This ad hominem reaction is even more egregious when applied to arguments: 
although detection of bias might reasonably make us wary of someone’s assertions, 
the inferences drawn from those assertions can and should be assessed 
independently of the biases of the one drawing the inference.  And ignoring the 
reasoning behind an inference is one of the worst forms of intellectual laziness. 
 
 
